

Gen. Taber Clarifies DoD Drug Abuse Program For Newsmen

Army Lieutenant General Robert C. Taber, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), at a special Pentagon news briefing June 21, discussed the Department of Defense's drug abuse program with newsmen.

Regarding military urinalysis testing programs, used to detect drug abuse by servicemen, Gen. Taber explained that the tests had already started in Vietnam and were scheduled to expand there by July 1.

Testing programs in other parts of the world would begin in late July, he said, adding that, because of associated technician and equipment problems, "It will be some months before we are fully into our worldwide program."

Responding as to whether or not the mandatory urinalysis tests might conflict with Fifth Amendment provisions against self-incrimination, the general said that the legal aspects had been looked into very carefully before testing began. He

explained that the urinalysis was a medical type of test and there was no infringement of individual rights.

Gen. Taber indicated that the total program, as planned, was a nonpunitive, compassionate program, and said that there would be no punitive measures arising solely from the specific tests.

He clarified the matter saying that if a soldier, sailor or airman has been in trouble—not necessarily drugs—then ob-

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COMMANDERS DIGEST

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Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, Reviews Area Situation; Congressional Committee Is Told Of 'Dramatic Changes'



PENTAGON AFFAIR. James E. Johnson, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), right, receives a certificate of appointment and the congratulations of Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird in a ceremony which took place June 16 at the Pentagon. Looking on, center, is Secretary of the Navy John H. Chafee. Mr. Johnson was formerly Vice Chairman, U.S. Civil Service Commission.
(DoD Photo by Frank Hall)

Admiral John S. McCain Jr., USN, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, in a far-reaching statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, May 25, discussed the Administration's International Security Assistance Program for Fiscal Year 1972 as it relates to the Pacific Command.

The admiral noted that, since his appearance before the same committee two years ago, some dramatic changes have been made in the Western Pacific situation, changes that involve not only the strategic situation relative to the Indochina conflict, but also that involve the impact of new and important changes in national security policy.

Admiral McCain's talk covered four broad areas: the threat in the Pacific area of command; a review of the strategic and tactical situation there; the relationship of security assistance to the situation; and an outline of probable future trends in the Western Pacific.

In Asia, the Admiral said, "The basic

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Commander-In-Chief, Pacific, Reviews Situation

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threat is the continued and unrelenting ambition of the Communists to erode United States influence on a worldwide scale and create an atmosphere favorable to Communist interest and ambitions. . . . It is ideological, diplomatic, economic and military."

Major Points

Following are some of the major points of his talk as he presented them to the Committee:

Some people seem to take false consolation in the supposition that if [Red China and Soviet Russia] were to go to war with each other it might work to the advantage of Free Nations. This is not so. If these two giant powers were to go to war, that vortex would bring in the rest of the human race.

In the Pacific, the United States is faced with four Communist powers: Russia, North Korea, Red China and North Vietnam. And, gentlemen, we can be thankful that these four powers do not always agree with each other, because if they all pursued their common goal compatibly, we would have problems of a magnitude far exceeding those which we face today.

THE SOVIET UNION

The Soviet Union has long been a European power; however, Russia is an Asian and a Pacific power as well. Considering only her forces in the Far East, the Soviets now deploy about 250,000 men in land forces. Naval forces based in the Pacific include approximately 50 major combatant vessels and—I want to stress this figure—over 100 submarines. Most importantly, we should not overlook the fact that the Soviet Pacific Fleet is a relatively modern force. . . . The Soviet Far East Air Forces include over a thousand jet bombers as well as hundreds of nuclear-tipped missiles.

. . . There has been a movement seaward indicated by their increase in Polaris type missiles and the fact that her expanding submarine missile fleet may exceed ours by 1974. We must keep in mind that Soviet Russia is moving in all areas—land, sea and air, which points to the fact that it is no longer possible to clearly delineate between land, sea and air warfare.

. . . Soviet Russia is in the process of

leap-frogging all over the world, politically, economically, and militarily. In my view, her incursions have been particularly significant in the Indian Ocean. . . .

Russia now keeps in the Indian Ocean up to a dozen warships, including an occasional submarine. Furthermore, these naval ships and her merchant ships visit some 20 nations throughout that area. . . .

The Soviet Union has evinced an interest in several of the islands in the eastern portion of the Indian Ocean and has recently landed on and studied at least one island. If the USSR should opt to develop bases in these islands, she could control the Red Sea. I predict there is going to be a tremendous movement within the next 12 months to open the Suez Canal.

Fishing Fleet

Soviet Russia has established a fishing fleet support arrangement with Mauritius. There is a lot more there than meets the eye also, because this brings her in close contact with those great trade routes which pass around the southern tip of Africa.

Another point is that she probably wants base rights on Mauritius and also on the Andaman Islands which belong to India. She would greatly desire access to port facilities at Visakhapatnam. Were Russia to gain a base on the East Coast of India, it might give her control over the Strait of Malacca—another strategic trade route.

There are four great constrictions of trade routes throughout the world: the Strait of Malacca, the Suez Canal, the Strait of Gibraltar, and the Panama Canal. . . . Soviet Russia would like to have strategic control of any of these choke points. . . .

Soviet Russia does not use sea power in its parochial sense. She uses sea power to gain access to countries which otherwise would be inaccessible. After establishing herself with maritime trade, the Soviets follow with political and economic influence, then, where circumstances dictate, with air and land power.

We cannot ignore the fact that Russia is also expanding her influence closer to home. The election of a Marxist president in Chile may have opened another

door. The Soviet Union is reported to have offered assistance to several of the countries along the Pacific Coast of South America in developing their fishing industries. This is a typical pattern in the development of stronger Soviet influence. . . .

CUBA

As far as Cuba is concerned, some people like to say that the Soviets may be disenchanted with Mr. [Premier Fidel] Castro. Well, if they are still willing to spend millions of dollars to keep Cuba alive, I am inclined to believe they must think Mr. Castro is worth the investment. . . .

COMMUNIST CHINA

In Red China, because of reasons which are not quite clear to me, Mao Tse-tung has not continually had the centralized, organized government that one might suspect. Recent evidence would suggest that a stable government with military influence is now in effective control.

The Red Chinese . . . are beginning to open up again. They are sending ambassadors all over the world. This business of sending an ambassador to Russia has a wide range of possibilities as to what the future might hold. Of course, a common threat could draw Red China and Soviet Russia together again.

Red China is a great land power, and its massive population is reflected in an army of nearly 2,500,000 men and another 500,000 militia and other paramilitary forces. . . .

The Red Chinese Air Force has grown rapidly, thanks to earlier Russian help, and has an inventory today of several thousand combat aircraft. The navy is limited but expanding, and at the present time Red China has the world's fourth largest submarine fleet. . . .

By the mid 1970s, we can expect the Red Chinese to have a significant number.

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COMMANDERS DIGEST

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Editor: John R. German

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DOD DRUG ABUSE

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viously the Service would proceed with the case, considering the available facts.

Each case will be considered on its own merit, he stated.

Drug abuse tests for dependent families and civilians working overseas are available now in most areas on a voluntary basis, he said.

The general said the Defense Department is working on plans to test all military personnel at least once a year. In Vietnam, he continued, people who initially test positive might be tested several times during the standard one-year tour there. Officers will be given the test, too.

He explained that the present military drug abuse detection method utilized a free radical assay technique (FRAT). On July 1, he went on, a gas-liquid chromatography test—he termed it “a better test”—will be used to back up the FRAT test. He said that although the chromatography test requires considerable laboratory work, it can be expanded to test heroin, barbiturates and amphetamines.

Gen. Taber spelled out the treatment that a serviceman would receive once identified as a drug user. Using a serviceman in Vietnam as an example, he explained that, following a positive test, there would be a five- to seven-day “detoxification” period during which time the man can be separated from the drug and no longer have a physical dependence on it, although he might still have a psychological dependence—“a difficult thing to treat,” he said.

During the detoxification period, he stressed the patient will receive very intensive counseling, both by sociologists and psychologists, and, if indicated, psychiatrists. Methadone may be used on a selective basis. Following detoxification, the patient will be flown to a treatment center in the U.S. Doctors will determine whether the patient can be released or needs further treatment.

Men having considerable time remaining in service, he explained, would be treated. Men at the end of their term of service would have two possibilities: to extend their term of service voluntarily to get treatment, or, if they do not want to extend, be discharged, and steered to the Veterans Administration or civilian facilities for treatment.

Other points of the briefing included:

—Continuing drug users would not be able to reenlist, although ex-users would be considered for reenlistment on a case-by-case basis. Evidence of successful rehabilitation would be necessary.

—Drug users, once detected, would lose sensitive security clearances.

—6,700 persons have turned themselves in under the “amnesty” programs in Vietnam during the first five months of 1971. The initial results of the urinalysis testing program—underway only three or

four days at the time of the press briefing—were not yet available.

—Treatment will be largely on an outpatient-type basis. New buildings are not required, but more technicians are. The Army plans to operate 43 military “half-way” houses in the United States, and similar facilities are being expanded in Vietnam.

—Heroin users can become addicted even though they smoke or sniff the drug rather than “mainline” (vein injecting) it.

DRUG ABUSE STATISTICS—(VIETNAM) CALENDAR YEARS—1968-1969-1970

	Number of Military Individuals Investigated		
	1968	1969	1970
HARD NARCOTICS			
Army	119	257	726
Navy	3	3	24
Air Force	6	9	50
Marine Corps	46	40	54
Total U.S. Forces (Vietnam)	174	309	854
MARIJUANA			
Army	2,956	5,351	6,790
Navy	336	295	329
Air Force	168	263	254
Marine Corps	728	1,828	1,039
Total U.S. Forces (Vietnam)	4,188	7,737	8,412
DANGEROUS DRUGS			
Army	37	604	1,066
Navy	5	14	57
Air Force	6	15	32
Marine Corps	61	259	394
Total U.S. Forces (Vietnam)	109	892	1,549
Rate Per 1,000 Investigated			
HARD NARCOTICS			
Army	.36	.74	2.51
Navy	.08	.08	1.09
Air Force	.11	.17	1.13
Marine Corps	.58	.60	1.55
Total U.S. Forces (Vietnam)	.33	.59	2.06
MARIJUANA			
Army	8.92	15.63	23.68
Navy	9.65	8.45	16.21
Air Force	3.11	4.90	5.67
Marine Corps	9.06	25.25	29.81
Total U.S. Forces (Vietnam)	7.99	14.77	20.27
DANGEROUS DRUGS			
Army	.11	1.75	3.73
Navy	.03	.42	2.02
Air Force	.11	.28	.71
Marine Corps	.74	3.84	10.49
Total U.S. Forces (Vietnam)	.21	1.68	3.73

(Chart used June 9 by Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) Roger T. Kelley to discuss drug abuse in the U.S. Armed Forces before the Senate Subcommittee on Alcoholism and Narcotics.)



TOP-LEVEL COMMANDERS. Admiral John S. McCain Jr., left, joins Army General Creighton W. Abrams, Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), to discuss Indochina matters. (U.S. Navy Photo by SP4 Dwight Carter)

C-IN-C, PACIFIC

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ber of operational medium range missiles. Even more disturbing is the fact that Red China may have conducted a reduced range test of an intercontinental ballistic missile. Within the next few years, the Red Chinese could have a limited operational capability with intercontinental missiles.

Before proceeding further, I want to mention the dispute which is going on between Red China and Soviet Russia. Soviet Russia, in my opinion, is not going to provoke war with China at this stage in history.

Peking, on the other hand, is faced with internal problems. . . . The Red Chinese are not apt to go to war at this stage in history. . . .

Let me emphasize that the men in Hanoi and Kim Il Sung in Pyongyang walk a tightrope between Moscow and Peking because they are aware of the differences which exist between these two Capitals. They also know that Moscow provides the bulk of the war materiel to the North Vietnamese in support of their present efforts in Indochina. North Korea would also require considerable support from Russia to conduct any war she might get into.

Red China, too, provides a significant

contribution to the total Communist bloc assistance to North Korea and North Vietnam; small amounts come from other European Communist powers. . . .

NORTH KOREA

The North Koreans are unpredictable, but they are implacably hostile to the South Korean Government and determined to unify the country under Communist rule. They pose a very real threat, with a large and well-equipped army, an air force with modern jet aircraft, and a growing patrol boat force. North Korea is dependent upon either Soviet or Red Chinese backing for any all-out assault upon the south, but has pursued a policy of harassment of South Korea and the United States in recent years. . . .

The North Korean conventional and unconventional threat to South Korea remains undiminished since the end of the Korean War. The North Korean Army is a well-trained, well-balanced force. It numbers at least 350,000 men, organized into the equivalent of 20 small, but powerful divisions. . . .

Although numerically larger, the South Korean Army suffers a modernization problem. Much of the equipment is of Korean War vintage and some equipment still in use is of World War II vintage. Combat infantry divisions have less than the total number of required

wheeled vehicles and engineer equipment is both in short supply and old. . . .

The South Korean Navy is small, but well trained and well disciplined. Its effectiveness is impaired by the limited speed and obsolescence of existing ships. There is a serious need to supplement this force with some destroyers and smaller anti-infiltration boats. Virtually all South Korean ships are World War II vintage. . . .

Major Threat

The North Korean Air Force presents the major threat to the security of South Korea, primarily because of its capability to launch a surprise low-level attack. Included in the inventory are over 450 jet fighters and bombers. . . .

North Korea has approximately 15 modern airfields, some of them probably with caves for aircraft storage, against about half that number in the Republic of Korea, which are not even completely revetted, much less which have caves for aircraft storage and maintenance.

As you know, the economic growth and stability of the Republic of Korea since the Korean War is a direct reflection of the United States program of military and economic assistance, combined with South Korean determination to develop themselves into a modern nation. . . .

In 1970, at the request of Secretary Melvin R. Laird, a plan for modernizing the ROK forces in the five-year period of FY 1971-1975 was developed jointly with the Government of South Korea.

Improve Posture

The plan will substantially improve the deterrent and survivability posture of the armed forces of the Republic of Korea as well as eliminate the majority of the existing deficiencies. [The U.S.] Congress, in recognition of the importance of modernizing South Korean armed forces, passed a supplemental appropriation of \$150 million in FY 71 over and above the \$140 million regular Korea MAP. A reduction of 20,000 authorized U.S. military spaces has also been directed by the President, and, consequently, the withdrawal of one U.S. infantry division will be completed by 30 June 1971. . . .

Thus, while the U.S. military presence in Korea is being reduced as a result of Congressional appropriations in support of the first year of the five-year modernization plan, the Republic of Korea is

undertaking an increasingly greater portion of its defense. This is a good example of the Nixon Doctrine—a doctrine of realistic deterrence—in operation. . .

JAPAN

The Japanese realize that their influence as a moderating force in Asia is limited as long as the major portion of their own defense is provided by the United States. In the future, I believe, we can expect an increased Japanese defense budget, more emphasis on external affairs, and the realization that their reacquisition of Okinawa and desires for a greater voice in Asian affairs will require more of a defense effort on their part. We expect, however, that our close military relationships with Japan will continue with few changes for the next several years. . .

Okinawa is a major Free World bastion. The relationship of our Okinawan bases to the collective security of Northeast Asia is understood by the Japanese Government by the majority of informed Japanese people, and indeed by responsible leaders and citizens of all the Free Asian nations. These bases provide storage for large quantities of back-up supplies necessary for rapid reaction to logistical needs anywhere in the Pacific area. Additionally, U.S. Marine forces stationed on Okinawa will provide a rapid reaction Reserve force available for commitment when and where required. . .

NATIONALIST CHINA

Another deterrent to aggression in Asia is the force inhering of Nationalist China on Taiwan. . .

The Republic of China's Air Force has several hundred aircraft. Most of these are jet but include only a relatively small percentage of modern aircraft. Its mission is oriented toward the defense of Taiwan.

Its navy, consisting of destroyers, pa-

trol boats, amphibious forces, and mine warfare craft, is oriented toward defense of the island and patrol activities in the Strait of Taiwan.

We can assume all Chinese Communist planning must consider the Taiwan force; consequently, any aggressive intent has a certain built-in limitation which is beneficial to the entire region. We foresee the role of the Republic of China as one of restraining Communist China, a role vital to the area. . .

The major orientation of our security assistance programs for the Republic of China in FY 72 is toward improvement in the general defensive posture of the armed forces.

Lion's Share

Currently, the Republic of China is absorbing the lion's share of its own defense costs and has developed impressive capabilities in repair and rehabilitation facilities as well as significant co-production capabilities. The repair and rebuild programs are so comprehensive that the Republic of China has almost total capability for repair or rebuild of in-country military assets for all Services. The cost of these programs is borne entirely by the Republic of China through local financing for in-country cost and through U.S. Foreign Military Sales credit for United States equipment requirements.

PHILIPPINES

The [President Ferdinand E.] Marcos' administration [in the Republic of the Philippines] faces several serious problems. These include an unproductive economic situation and growing social and student unrest. On the favorable side, aggressive counterinsurgency actions have inflicted serious blows to the resurgent Communist insurgency movement. The threat, although diminished, continues in a new Maoist form.

Clark Air Base and the Cubi/Subic [Cubi Point Naval Air Station and Subic Bay Naval Base] Base complex are important U.S. facilities. U.S.-Philippine working groups have commenced technical talks in Manila as the first phase of renegotiating the Military Bases Agreement. . .

There is one disturbing factor in the Philippines. Recently they sent a delegation to Moscow to discuss the opening of trade relations. When this delegation returned to the Philippines, it strongly recommended that a similar delegation be sent to Peking. I do not know what the future will hold regarding this new development, but we will have to keep a close eye on this situation.

MAP Funding

Military Assistance Program (MAP) funding for the Philippines has generally declined over the past few years, but has reached a minimum level of support for necessary objectives.

There are modernization problems in the Philippine Armed Forces similar to those which exist in other countries.

The basic military threat in the Philippines is internal and results from Communist-oriented dissident groups. . . There are also basic problems in maintaining law and order as well as a serious problem with smuggling and piracy. . .

The concentration of MAP effort in FY 72 will be aimed at problems of mobility and communication. . .

Our Philippine MAAG (Military Assistance Advisory Group) has continually emphasized self-sufficiency in plan and program development and has enjoyed acceptable success. . .

INDONESIA

The once powerful Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), is now a threat only in the long run. The social and economic chaos inherited from [the late President] Sukarno remains an enormous problem. . .

The Indonesians are in need of economic assistance and military assistance training. Here again, no American troops are needed—just a modest but immediate and continuing amount of economic support and military assistance. . .

The history of military assistance to Indonesia has been stormy and complicated by competition from the Soviet Union. As you know, the Russians have

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U.S. MILITARY STRENGTH IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIETNAM

	As of 24 June 71	As of 17 Jun 71
Army	192,600	194,500
Navy	10,900	11,000
Marines	900	1,900
Air Force	37,200	37,400
Coast Guard	100	100
TOTAL	241,700*	244,900

In addition, approximately 18,000 Navy personnel with 7th Fleet forces and 200 U.S. Coast Guard personnel are aboard ships operating off the coast of Vietnam.

*This is a decrease of 3,200 over the previous week.

C-IN-C, PACIFIC

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invested about a billion dollars in equipment and they are anxious to recoup some of this loss.

Increased United States military assistance funding for Indonesian programs is absolutely essential. As in the past, the bulk of these funds will be used to support military efforts aiding economic rehabilitation. . .

MALAYSIA

Malaysia is a nonaligned nation, rich in resources, with strong traditional ties to the west. A continuing problem in this country is the division of population, consisting of 4.5 million Malays to 4 million Chinese. Friction between these two races is still strong, and the resulting political turbulence in Malaysia has threatened relations with Singapore.

We have only small military assistance training programs in Malaysia and it is important that we maintain these programs . . . This effort is augmented with a small amount of DOD Foreign Military Sales credit assistance which is also essential . . . We in the Pacific Command consider it essential to our long-term interest in this vital transition zone between South and East Asia that Singapore's military and commercial facilities be available to the Free World in the event of hostilities in the region.

BURMA

Turning now to Burma, we have a country which is presently suffering from a stagnant economy and insurgent control of large areas of the country. Chinese Communist aid to insurgents in the northeastern areas of the nation poses an ominous threat. . . The next 12 months may be critical in determining the nature and probable success of their intervention in Burma.

The Burmese Army is hard pressed to deal with internal security, and it would be unable to offer effective resistance to a major attack by Red China.

THAILAND

At the present time, the insurgency in Thailand does not present a direct threat to the stability of the Thai Government or to its ability to control significant portions of the rural populace.

However, during the recent few years, the Communists, using terrorism, propaganda, and attacks on smaller government outposts, have increased their strength and organization despite gov-

ernment efforts of suppression and development.

In the north, the Communists, working principally with local tribal people, have built a small but effective military arm, have established extensive bases along the Thailand border, and have mobilized segments of the Hilltribe population in the border areas to provide support for them.

The continued expansion of the insurgency in Thailand is a serious cause for concern over the long term. . .

There are economic, administrative and military limits to what the Thai can do to help their neighbors. The Thai are reluctant to expand military involvement much beyond their borders without substantial United States support and reliable assurance of continued support. As I see it, what we need in the future to reassure our Thai friends, is to continue to provide military assistance which will insure improvement of current military capabilities, foster regional cooperation and compensate somewhat, for American combat redeployments. . .

LAOS

As to Laos, we are primarily concerned with interdicting the enemy's support efforts channeled toward South Vietnam and Cambodia. By attriting his capability to carry out his intentions in South Vietnam and Cambodia, we are directly supporting the Vietnamization program and decreasing the danger to our troops as they are redeployed. We recognize that we will never completely shut off the flow, but we are exacting a high price from the enemy. . .

In the near future the Chinese Communists will have established an all-weather motorable road which extends from Red China in the north, Dien Bien Phu to the east, all the way across Laos to the Mekong River, which is itself a great water highway. Although making no overt threats, I believe that the Chinese Communists intend to use this road to apply pressure on both the Governments of Laos and Thailand. It will definitely extend their capability to support year-round insurgent operations, and has already virtually cut off Northwest Laos from the rest of the country.

CAMBODIA

Events of the past year or so in Cambodia emphasize, again, the regional nature of the war. For well over five years the enemy was afforded the luxury of

free access to sanctuary areas and lines of communication in Cambodia. From these bases he posed a serious and increasing threat to the Vietnamization program. From my standpoint, one of the great acts of moral courage and discipline was President Nixon's decision to move into Cambodia. . .

We have hurt the enemy seriously and have forced him to divert his efforts to the implementation of a new strategy. . .

Recent History

The recent history of military assistance to Cambodia is very short—only about one calendar year. And it is one of the best investments we have made toward bringing the conflict in Indochina to a successful conclusion and furtherance of the Nixon Doctrine.

A year ago the Cambodian Armed Forces numbered an estimated 35,000 poorly trained, poorly equipped troops. Today these forces exceed 200,000 and are gradually increasing in combat effectiveness. . .

Current Cambodian strategy calls for Cambodian forces initially to defend a line roughly along Routes 6 and 7 across Cambodia until forces have been strengthened to the point where they have the capability to conduct offensive operations to regain control of all their country.

To assist in accomplishing this strategy, the U.S. is providing indirect support through the military assistance program.

The proposed FY 72 program provides minimum essential items in support of on-going combat operations and to equip and train some additional units. The training involved is primarily for basic foot soldiers and to set up maintenance and logistics facilities. No U.S. personnel are conducting training activities in Cambodia. . .

The [Cambodian] people are a tough lot; they are anti-Communist and they want to fight. And they are going to fight as long as we can get the necessary equipment and supplies to them.

Confronting Aggression

I want to emphasize that foremost in the Cambodian Government's policy is that confronting Communist aggression in Cambodia is a job for Cambodians. They are not only willing, they are anxious to be able to do the job. The strategy being followed there is Cambodian—not U.S. And it is a sound strategy.

Despite recent substantial setbacks caused by allied operations in Laos and

Cambodia, the over-all objective of North Vietnam has not changed. The primary near-term objective of the leadership in Hanoi is complete domination of South Vietnam, with a longer-term objective of expanding its sphere of influence over all Indochina. . .

SOUTH VIETNAM

In South Vietnam, the Vietnamization program, which is one of the basic tenets of the Nixon Doctrine for Southeast Asia, seeks to relieve the U.S. Armed Forces of the combat burden of the war and replace, with dollars and materiel, United States troop units in-country. . .

Vietnamization is progressing well. . .

Pacification, too, is progressing. . .

During 1970, the nature of the war began to change from a territorial struggle to an internal security struggle. This struggle will be supplemented by a political contest. . .

Proof that Vietnamization is working is that captured documents show that the primary purpose of the VC/NVA [Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army] is to destroy the effectiveness of both Vietnamization and pacification. We feel very strongly, however, that North Vietnam continues to plan for a long, protracted war. . .

Limited Capability

The enemy maintains a limited capability for offensive operations. He will probably retain the ability to conduct limited ground attacks in selected areas of the Republic of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. The VC/NVA will continue to have the capability to conduct attacks by fire throughout Indochina. The enemy will continue to possess the capability

to conduct sapper, terrorist, and guerilla attacks on populated areas and bases in the Republic of Vietnam and in Cambodia. . .

One major enemy objective is not concerned with physical conduct of the war at all—it is to exert pressure on U.S. public opinion favorable to his objectives in Indochina. And, we must keep this in mind all the time. . .

I would now like to set the record straight on the recent ARVN (Army of the Republic of South Vietnam) cross-border operations into Laos: The mission of Lamson 719 was to disrupt the enemy logistics network in the Lao panhandle, which has become vitally important since the severing of his logistics capability across Cambodia. . . The mission was accomplished.

Lamson 719

Although it may be some time before we can fully assess the results of Lamson 719, we know that enemy materiel losses were staggering. He lost an amount of food that could have fed 139 battalions at two pounds per man a day for 30 days; individual weapons were captured and/or destroyed that could have equipped 14 battalions; and 20 battalions could have been equipped with crew-served weapons captured or destroyed.

Summary

In summary, throughout Southeast Asia, the enemy is faced with problems that he has not encountered in the last decade. . .

Successes in the Vietnamization program and regional cooperation among

Asian allies will advance progress toward United States goals in Indochina. Our goals remain: to end American casualties; to continue the withdrawal of our forces; to accelerate Vietnamization progress; and to successfully implement the Nixon Doctrine throughout East Asia and the Pacific.

I would like to address each of these points in order:

American casualties are being reduced. . .

By December of this year, our forces in RVN (Republic of South Vietnam) will have been reduced from a level of 549,500 in 1969 to 184,000. These reductions have been due largely to the improved performance of South Vietnamese forces, and the success of the Vietnamization program. Future reductions are expected to continue, although they will be phased in a manner best suited to meet the prevailing situation.

American Reduction

Another measurement in the reduction of American involvement is the reduced number of tactical air sorties flown in Southeast Asia. In the last half of 1970 alone the number of sorties flown was reduced by almost half from the rate in the beginning of the year. . .

The Nixon Doctrine is being implemented in the area of the Pacific. It is not a goal we hope to reach sometime in the undefined future. It is happening now.

Under the doctrine we will remain a Pacific power and we will honor treaty commitments with our Asian allies. But we do expect them to pick up an increasing share of their own defense burden and assume the primary responsibility providing the required combat manpower. This will allow a significant draw-down of our own forces.

And, under the Nixon Doctrine we are reducing our forces throughout the Pacific. . .

Two Things Happen

As these reductions are being made, two things must happen. One, we must place increased reliance on our rapid reaction forces. Specifically in the Pacific Command this means increased reliance on air and naval forces.

And secondly, as these forces are withdrawn, something must fill the void which is being created. A viable program of

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U.S. Customs Intensifies Drug Searches

Citing the drive to end the flow of dangerous drugs into the United States, the Department of Defense has noted delays may result in the movement of mail and cargo because of the newly instituted 100 per cent examination procedure.

Parcels mailed at APO/FPO points are being examined before being accepted for mailing. In addition, baggage, household goods, and cargo shipments all will be thoroughly inspected before being permitted to be loaded for shipment to the United States.

This intensified U.S. Customs inspec-

tion will include all military cargo and personal items of military personnel returning to the U.S. from Vietnam and Thailand.

In signing the memorandum, which outlined the intensified Customs program, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard appointed the U.S. Army as agency of primary responsibility. The Navy and Air Force have been requested to assign personnel to special teams which will be used to augment U.S. Customs personnel at ports of entry into the United States.

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military assistance is the cornerstone of success of the Nixon Doctrine; it is the sensible way to fill the void. In the past, the American soldier standing on foreign soil has been the symbol of American resolve and the visible evidence of credibility behind our treaty alliances. This American soldier to a large extent is coming home. To take his place our allies seek a visible expression of continued American resolve in the form of material assistance. . .

Contributing significantly to the overall Security Assistance picture are the Foreign Military Cash and Credit Sales programs for distribution of excess defense articles.

The proposed Foreign Military Credit Sales programs with the Republic of China and the Republic of Korea, in particular, mark a healthy stride in the direction of increased self-reliance.

Excess Articles

The distribution of excess defense articles also plays an important role in the total Security Assistance picture. Excess defense articles are utilized in consonance with the principle that security assistance objectives are goals to be achieved by practical and prudent management of all available resources, not limited to the expenditure of foreign assistance appropriated dollars.

As we currently plan and execute the withdrawal of military forces from Vietnam, it is imperative that the U.S. gain maximum utilization of excess materiel assets. . .

In FY 72 the bulk of excess defense articles will be made available to [Nationalist] China and [Republic of] Korea, with lesser amounts to other countries in the Pacific Command.

The final element of a total security assistance program for the Pacific Command is the grant aid portion which I have addressed previously by country.

Important Role

I would like to emphasize the importance of one part of this program—which is the Military Assistance Training Program. It provides the technical and professional training necessary to handle the equipment furnished, improve host country training capability and provides allied officers who are expected to be the leaders of tomorrow in their countries, an appreciation of American values and standards.

The highest priority in the Pacific Command training program is Resources Management, which includes the areas of procurement, maintenance, supply, personnel, finance and property disposal. . .

President's Message

I would like to point to a statement from the President's message to the Congress in the proposed International Security Assistance Act:

"Our new security assistance program will seek to strengthen local defense capabilities by providing that mix of military and supporting economic assistance which is needed to permit friendly foreign countries to assume additional defense burdens themselves without causing them undue political or economic costs."

In consonance with the goals outlined by President Nixon in his message to the Congress on consolidation and revision of the Foreign Assistance Act, I am exploring new initiatives in several PACOM countries. The countries of particular interest are those which are emerging industrially and technologically. . . Our trial ground is Korea, where we are examining methods to support their new organization which is charged with developing limited technological and production capabilities for military materiel. Because of the Korean Government's strong commitment to the concept, we have great confidence that this venture will succeed. If so, it can serve as a precedent for other emerging nations. . .

Increases in some defense programs are the best way to reduce defense spending as a whole. Security assistance programs are a case in point. They provide the means for transferring to allied and friendly nations the military equipment and training necessary for them to provide for their own and the common defense. . .


We must be cautious not to invite disaster—the reduction in American presence will create a political-military void and this void must not be left unfilled. We must assure our allies of continued American resolve. A viable International Security Assistance Program is essential in both of the regards.

We must keep in mind that we, as a Nation, are not involved because of our commitments, we have commitments because we are involved.

Dr. Rousselot Resigns As DoD Health Expert

Dr. Richard S. Wilbur, Deputy Executive Vice President of the American Medical Association in Chicago, has been named to succeed Dr. Louis M. Rousselot as Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health and Environment).

Dr. Rousselot resigned from the position June 17, citing "personal reasons" in a letter to Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird. He had served three and a half years with the Defense Department.



DR. ROUSSELOT

In a letter to Dr. Rousselot accepting his resignation, Secretary Laird wrote: "Your work to strengthen the Defense Health Program and establish the Defense Environmental Quality Program has provided the Department with a firm foundation from which to administer these activities. We appreciate your efforts and recognize the significance of your contributions."

Dr. Rousselot will remain in office until the Senate confirms Dr. Wilbur's appointment, officials noted.

Dr. Wilbur, who served as a U.S. Navy physician from 1947 to 1949, graduated from Stanford University in 1943 and received his doctorate from the same institution's medical school in 1946. A specialist in internal medicine, he practiced medicine at the Palo Alto Medical Clinic, Palo Alto, Calif., from 1952 until 1969, when he moved to Chicago to take up his duties with the AMA there.